Monday, December 20, 2010

This and That, Bits and Pieces ...


Roger Lowenstein @ Bloomberg News suggests the economy is recovering, but ...


Republicans claim that higher taxes translate to lower growth. Recent evidence is to the contrary. In the 1990s, the top tax rate was 39.6 percent. The U.S. enjoyed a booming economy, warmed by the balmy breezes of a balanced budget. In the 2000s, George W. Bush cut the top rate to 35 percent. Deficits ballooned, and the economy was mostly lousy.

Going back further, the connection is murky at best. In the 1960s, marginal tax rates were extremely high -- 70 percent and in some years even more. The economy roared. In the 1970s, taxes remained high and the economy slumped. In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan slashed taxes: By 1988, the marginal rate was only 28 percent and the tax code was greatly simplified. Clearly, those giant tax cuts, plus the elimination of many loopholes, stimulated a boom.

This isn't 1964, there is no dominion of American productivity. The boom that began in the 1980's was the beginning of the debt bubble and the sale of US output overseas. What remains is American debt and resource waste. What is being done to address this? Nothing. Energy never gets a mention. People bitch about outsourcing but nobody wants to upset the China debt-recycling apple cart. China mercantilism bankrupts the US as well as China. What a fiasco!

Meanwhile, TPC @ Pragmatic Capitalist examines commodities. wherein Dylan Grice @ SocGen calls commodity 'investors' speculators.

OUCH!




Commodity prices have underperformed other speculative vehicles since the modern era began:

Grice added that the purchase of commodities is actually the sale of human ingenuity. You are essentially betting that humans won’t one day replace their oil based energy needs with some alternative energy. Or you are betting that humans won’t find a way to more efficiently produce wheat:

I would add that Grice’s comments regarding innovation are applicable here as well. Ultimately, a bet on gold is a bet that we will revert back to some form of commodity based currency system which proves the modern fiat monetary system is flawed. But as I have previously explained, I believe this is faulty thinking in the long-run. In fact, the move from the gold standard was a form of financial innovation due to the fact that the gold standard imposed inherent restrictions on the modern complex and dynamic global economy.

What we are seeing in single currency Europe is in many ways equivalent to the flaws generated in a world which was once a single currency world (see here for more). Obviously, that system is highly flawed. And it was these inherent flaws that ultimately led to the demise of the gold standard. A move back to the gold standard would quite literally be like moving back into the stone age.

In the near-term, however, (remembering that all commodities are speculative bets) we can’t ignore the voracious demand for gold as a currency, the problems in Europe, the false belief that the Fed is “printing money” and the misguided belief that fiat currencies are not the wave of the future. As I have repeatedly stated in recent years, it’s likely that gold prices continue to surge higher as investors seek a safehaven from a world of economic uncertainty, political strife and what is viewed as a failing fiat currency in Europe. Ultimately, I still believe gold’s endgame in the current cycle is an irrational bubble, but that is a purely speculative short-term bet and not a long-term investment.

In conclusion, mathematician John Allen Paulos famously said:

“people generally worry only about what happens one or two steps ahead and anticipate being able to get out before a collapse… In countless situations people prepare exclusively for near-term outcomes and don’t look very far ahead. They myopically discount the future at an absurdly steep rate.”

Investors are caught in a wave of euphoria in the commodity markets today. And that’s not to say that it is wrong to own commodities or that their prices won’t be substantially higher in the coming years. But just remember that the product your Wall Street broker so nicely wrapped up for you is NOT an investment. It is a product that is guaranteed to line the pockets of bankers while you make nothing more than a speculative bet that a greater fool will one day buy from you at a higher price.


Maybe, maybe not. Commodity prices in general are self- limiting except in a few areas, one of which is gold.

In the past, high prices stimulated more production as miners, drillers and farmers increased yield, a process aided by greater returns on the commodities already sold. The high prices were limited by the appearance of the yield in the markets.

The response of oil production to high prices suggest this dynamic has been exhausted. Price increases do not bring new yields to markets. If the price of a commodity increases beyond what demand is physically able to support as an input, the demand disappears instead.  Finance can drive prices higher but the physical economy must find a margin -- a profit on the commodity's use. If the price of the input is too high, the economic return on its use is insufficient to support the high price.

The increase in costs in many retail goods and services is a reflection on the steady increase in energy costs since 1998, interrupted only by the plunge in oil prices in the Spring of 2009. Plastics, chemicals, processes, transport and infrastructure are all represent energy- dependencies embedded in these goods and services.  The retail market for products that endlessly cost more shrinks. Up until 2006 or so, the increase in product prices was hidden by the 'wealth effect'. Not so now.

At some point in our pauperizing USA, the high costs of products such as higher education, medical care and gasoline will plummet. The credit apparatus that supports the prices of these goods will fail. People who work in the credit apparatus will lose their jobs, taking their demand away. This is what debt deflation is, the effect of debt- driven high prices on demand.

Also, if you haven't already please subscribe to Jim Hansen's excellent 'Master Resource Report. This is a weekly newsletter that analyses energy markets and connects a lot of the production/consumption dots. Hansen along with Gregor McDonald are among the sharpest of the energy commentators.

To subscribe, send an email to: jim.hansen-at symbol-kmsfinancial.com and put the word 'Subscribe' on the subject line.

Check this out:

http://www.poodwaddle.com/worldclock.swf

Now that the holidays are here little will happen on markets as traders are with their families. You can do the same!

Bankers and politicians have gone back to their coffins ...

Thursday, December 16, 2010

More Thoughts on Precious Metals ...

The world is awash with debt which must and will be destroyed. This is natural, part of the ebb and flow of business. Unfortunately, there is so much debt that destroying enough to make a difference would trigger a run from the debt. There is no such thing as destroying just a little bit of debt.

The economy/output sets the price of things longer term. Finance can distort prices by adding credit which it is doing in PMs. In this case the large and growing 'paper' analogs are setting the price of PMs and other commodities as well. The scarcity of physical is self- amplifying as the paper alternatives (Gresham's 'bad money') drive out the physical (the 'good money'). Physical scarcity increases physical price which increases demand for paper which drives up the price increasing scarcity, etc.

The PMs are hostage to their paper cousins who grow like monsters. Increasing paper 'value' increasingly weighs on physical as metal becomes the collateral for the paper. PM derivatives are basically PM- backed debt. The derivatives are analogous to hard- money regimes of PM- backed 'convertible currencies'. The paper contracts circulate as debt- claims which continually increase against the physical collateral.

At the same time, the paper iterations of PMs are intertwined with other debt issues in other parts of the world's economies.

When the next deleveraging begins (next week?) the paper empires will collapse and collateral will be dumped onto any markets that appear to offer a bid. Cash will vanish and that will be the only item that anyone in the universe of debt will want or need. People will starve for lack of a dollar or two while businesses that are 'worth' millions will be available for the price of a meal. Nobody will have any cash. This is what happens in deflation.

This is simply a continuation of what has been taking place for many years. There is nothing that can change this dynamic ... except the arrival of four or more Saudi Arabias pumping oil ... and a partridge in a pear tree.

The world is going broke. It's running out of cash.

I see this all the time: "The central banks are printing money!" "There is going to be hyper- inflation!"

The estimable Nicole Foss says it best: "The bailouts are never for the little guy." What money- printing there is lives in the form of bailouts to banks and finance institutions. Much of the printed money resides in accounts @ the central banks as reserves. Much of this printed money is skimmed off and held in tax havens overseas safely out of reach of the little guy. Printing too much cash bailout money would devalue the funds held in  these tax havens, printing too little would leave too many financiers without the opportunity to 'cash out'.

Hyperinflation is when 'printed' money enters circulation, that is, the bailout reaches the bottom of the economic food chain. It only does so for a reason; to allow the elites to rob the bottom- dwellers of their savings. This is a problem in China, a nation of savers. Not so in America which has experienced inflation since the end of World War Two and has thoroughly adjusted to it. There is almost zero savings in America for elites to steal. The best hedge against inflation is for individuals/entities to fall into debt: this is what Americans have done with abandon. If inflation was to appear, existing debt would first have to be 'rationalized' as Americans and their businesses cannot support the debt that exists now and consequently cannot add to it.

Could this be done, inflation would manifest in America's favored inflation hedge, real estate lending. Real estate prices would increase, which is clearly not happening: (Case- Shiller house price chart by Redfin)





If there was inflation finance would enable the hedge as it did during the period leading up to the summer of 2006. Finance acts for its own benefit and inflation hedging is good business for finance. That was what the global debt bubble was all about in the first place! The creation of a hedge and keeping it going as long as possible. Only when the hedge started to fail did finance start to 'short' it.

Which leads to something I see this over and over, with regards to silver and other precious metals. Nobody gives with the good answer:

Why would JPM or any other business entity want to suppress the price of an asset?Mark McHugh @ Zero Hedge:


JP Morgan is the custodian of the ishares Silver Trust (SLV), which now holds over 350 million ounces of silver, provides sovereign and corporate investors with precious metals solutions (JP’s website), and is the largest short seller of silver in the history of the world. Berkshire Asset Management’s Eric Fry writes:

Based on some of the latest conjecture, Morgan’s short position totals a whopping 3.3 billion ounces. If, therefore, the buzz about J.P. Morgan and silver is even half true, the prestigious investment bank could be cruisin’ for bruisin’.

For perspective, 3.3 billion ounces is roughly equal to:

1) One third of all the world’s known silver deposits;

2) Two times the world’s approximate stockpiles of silver bullion;

3) Four times the annual mined supply of silver;

4) 30 times the inventory of silver at the COMEX.

If you can, forget about the conflict of interest, and ponder the enormity of the explosion.


The theory is that a rise in the gold or silver price will destroy the dollar while conveniently destroying JPM in the process. Consequently, JPM needs to manipulate the price down.

Why would it? People want to buy silver and if JPM cannot deliver the real thing it can certainly deliver a commonly accepted substitute: electronic dollars credited to the buyer's account! If the buyer is squeamish about 'non- monetary' paper money, JPM has no qualms and neither do the vast majority of its other customers who will and do accept it in the squeamish buyer's place. This part of finance is democratic: the dollar acceptors outvote the 'specie' customers so as to support JPM's finance activities including creating 'worthless' paper analogs to silver. Silver and gold exist in finance markets to support JPM's and other banks' finance activities. The majority of paper- dollar acceptors rules, even if they are 'stupid'!

One can argue with aspects of JPM's representations within markets but the FACT of JPM's dominance of the market Morgan itself largely defines cannot be disputed. To some degree, JPM is the market and existential arguments made against JPM are quixotic and counter to what the market and its vast customer base decrees.

The 'short bullion' position does not jeopardize JPM, it really cannot. A market has no restrictions upon where and when it will emerge. COMEX can suspend silver sales and these will emerge, later. The market will discover value somewhere and some time, even if that time is in the (distant) future and the place is Antarctica. This bit of human nature gives continuity to markets and the values these markets discover.

Howcum Picassos priced @ $20 million don't destroy the dollar? Anyone who buys the Picasso wants to sell it for more. This 'more' does not represent a value decline for the dollar but is instead a 'profit' to the seller.

If there are no Picassos on the market at any given time, the price does not shoot up to a billion- gazillion dollars due to mismatches between supply and demand. Buyers simply wait for more Picassos to appear. There can be no Jackson Pollocks available for years and a painting will cost more or less the same as a similar painting by Pollock cost during the time one was on the market. Why would a market shortage of gold cause the gold market to crash the economy or cause the price to shoot up by orders of magnitude? The persistence of markets and their value- discovering ability maintains a value 'memory' that carries from one market to another over decades if need be.

If a mechanical calculation was made of every relative value over any span of time, no good would be sold! How could it, as the chance of devalue in some aspect would outweigh any other consideration? Since goods are indeed sold, the relative value over time calculations are secondary considerations, relative currency values are rationalized. Indeed, commerce activity rendered 'dead' by overvalued currency is restored by deliberate 'devaluations'. Such a remedy Ireland prays for as it is saddled with currency calculations that stifle commerce.

Analysts claim that the same dollar does not purchase the amounts of goods and it did when the Picasso was bought, certainly not what it could purchase in 1913!

What of it? We live in the present, not in 1913. A Picasso's nominal value may indeed vary in inflation- adjusted terms. This is as much matter of circumstance rather than anything else. Currencies are a tool, not a cosmic axis around which the worlds spin. A good Picasso is worth more than a 'bad' one. A good thief can get a good Picasso for free.

Since 1913, the world's inflation or decline in quantity purchasing power is the footprint of progress, which has expanded the scope and utility of products and services available. There is little argument to be made against the utility of flush toilets, running hot water, electronic computers, hand- held telephones, antibiotics and other improvements. Who cares if the dollar buys less bully- beef than it did in 1913 ... or 1813, for that matter?

Who would trade today's products and dollars for 1913's products and dollars? This is what the China 'modernization' experiment is all about, to trade 1913 China for 2010 America! China would not be able to perform this experiment without American dollars with 2010 values.

It is indeed the value of the dollar -- either over- or undervalued -- that both enables AND undermines the China modernization experiment. 'Hard' or valuable dollars constrains China trade, threatening to collapse the Chinese Ponzi economy. Cheap dollars amplify Chinese inflation: the US exports any dollar inflation it generates to China by way of the dollar carry trade. China is trapped by its massive dollar surplus, the cost of managing it has grown to condemn the Chinese economy! They cannot afford to relinquish the surplus as it alone allows China to afford raw materials. It cannot afford to expand it as it is a form of savings sitting in the crosshairs of China's hyper- inflating elite.

People -- farmers -- need wheat, corn and soybeans, economies need crude oil. If all the gold in the world were to vanish tomorrow, it would not be missed. If all the farmers disappeared tomorrow, the human race would certainly follow the farmers into oblivion within a few weeks or months.

Invaluable crude oil is constrained in price by economic output. There is an upper limit to the price of crude; the price where it causes the economy to crash (which drives the crude price lower). $10,000 gold would be a curiosity. $300 oil would not happen as output and final demand would vanish before the price increased to anywhere near that price level.

Believe it or not, the Fed is pimping gold and silver. It is in the cash money business and needs 'hot' asset markets so it can trade other -- worthless -- assets for cash. The 'kill the dollar' propaganda is just that. You can tell by watching other markets; the Fed is pumping cash into these markets to raise the indexes and allow his money- laundering racket to operate.

The world is not on any informal gold standard. The hard currency is the dollar: priced in crude oil the dollar has real value. To the waste- based economy such as ours a gold standard is death. The world had gold standard in the early 1930's and maintaining it amplified the Depression, destroyed productive business and led to dictatorships.

Gold/silver standards have no better record for inflation/deflation or defaults than the fiat regimes of today. In fact, the fiat dollar has been an essential tool to keep the US out of a greater recession. Unfortunately, the de- facto crude- backed hard dollar will do its dirty work and destroy the US economy as it will destroy all the other 'modern' economies. This is what hard currencies do. Modern economies require increases in liquidity at all times. Hard currencies are hoarded and fall out of circulation. The intrinsic value of the gold 'currency' makes it an asset rather than 'money'.

(Sigh ...) Still no answer as to why JPM or any other business entity would want to suppress the price of an asset?

Not surprising. There is no answer. No bank will suppress an asset because they are in the asset business. Just as the central bank(s) are in the cash business. Higher prices mean more. More means bigger bonuses for bankers. No banker is going to reduce the 'price value' of an asset because doing so will adversely effect his bonus. The only exception is hedging: here, the 'hedge' in operation will have a greater value than the asset being hedged. The net value of the hedge is what matters, not the value of one side or another of it.

Arguably, the desired net value of a well- designed and executed hedge is zero.

The banks' commodity short positions are offset by equally large long positions on futures markets. The major banks are the bankers for the exchanges, themselves.

There is also a 'volatility premium' (VP) which is behind some kinds of hedges but this is a premium ... higher price. I don't know if there is a volatility premium added to PMs; I don't think JPM or another bank would create a large, naked position in a thinly traded market. Individuals within banks do so and these are uncovered frequently when the naked positions result in huge losses for the bank: the Barings incident comes to mind.  The VP does exist in petroleum which is a vastly larger and more important market.

In a perfect world, a currency has negative value, this is inflation in the ordinary sense. What has value in an economy is commerce not money: commerce's value increases at the expense of the currency that measures it. This fact is hard to grasp but self- evident. The common error that metals investors make is to confuse monetary devices (currency, credit, coupons, 'money') with assets and to do so when it is convenient. Assets have intrinsic value while the monetary tools do not. When the tools gain intrinsic value they cease to be tools and become assets.

The issue in an economy then is the value of assets versus the value of commerce.

Currency enables commerce; increased value of the currency/asset means less value to commerce. When the currency obtains intrinsic value for any reason it ceases to enable commerce. It becomes a collectible. Assets are useless as money as they do not circulate, they are hoarded. This is what undermines intrinsic monetary regimes, the intrinsic is hoarded and the outcome is deflation.

"Wealth" and "stores of wealth" are collective suspensions of disbelief. They are promises. What is taking place in the greater world is the unraveling of promises. The promises made for precious metals are no more or less valid that any of the other finance promises.

When promises themselves lose value -- that is, they mean different things to different people -- what denotes each individual promise becomes irrelevant. In this (apocalyptic) situation, few if any counters will have much currency or meaning whether these be metals or letters of credit or anything else. Context is what matters: it sets primary values of the different forms of promises.

This is the difference between metals and crude right now. Crude has economic value and is priced by what the economy produces with that oil plus a profit, if any. Metals have fallen into the JPM context of finance/Ponzi enablers. Finance has inflated the value of metals to the point where they are uneconomical. The fantastic desires of PM investors gear into the promotion of finance- created Ponzi schemes, multiplied by the Ponzi- driven increase in dollar price.

As a Ponzi operator, JPM nor any other bank will short- sell an asset to the public although they may 'claim' by way of 'third parties' to do so for marketing reasons. This is the real answer to the JPM question. Think about it. Gullible PM investors are up against the bank's advertising departments.

The characteristic that metals have that other assets do not share is accessibility to those with less than great wealth. They are 'redneck wealth' in this age when real finance wealth is expressed in $10 billion notational swaps or multi- billion dollar blocks of stock. A gold or silver coin can be had for a few hundred dollars on Ebay or at a pawn shop. At the same time, the vast majority of the world's citizens do not have silver or gold in any form. This relationship of haves- versus- have nots reflects the social structure of wealthy but on a much smaller scale. This is really not a 'wealth' issue but rather a metallic form of polemic or revolutionary expression. Silver becomes the means to attack an unresponsive institution by the 'mob'. So sez Max Keiser on teevee!

But ... this is also absurd, using the instruments of 'wealth' (not commerce) against the entity that confers value to the instrument in the first place! If gold or silver actually represented a threat to the establishment, there would be no gold or silver available to anyone at a price, just like there is little or no weapons- grade Uranium or Plutonium or high explosives available except at stratospheric prices that only the 'safely wealthy' can afford.

Having said all this, a careful investor looks at all sides of an investment without staking a polemical position or becoming emotional about it. The question of why a bank would suppress asset value is crucial. Without the emotional baggage that attaches to the hoped- for demise of a hated institution, metals have investment utility and nothing more. Adding the baggage makes metals another currency/liquidity trap that will surely and effectively destroy what (small) wealth the precious metal investor possesses. Here, the 'JPM silver short' is a comforting rationalization that obscures what is plainly visible to anyone looking out the window:

America is going broke the old fashioned way, it's running out of cash. Whether Americans have gold or silver or not is largely irrelevant.


EDIT: Here's another take from Andrea Hotter @ the Wall Street Journal.

Wednesday, December 15, 2010

Bond Market Meltdown!

Long Treasury bonds, US municipal issues, and overseas sovereigns were all hammered, yesterday. All of this is part of a longer- running trend of declining bond prices and a flight from risk.

What kind of risk?




Both the 10 year above and the 30 year took significant losses yesterday. These are March, 2011 futures charts from estimable TFC charts.





Here is some of the carnage in munis. This sector has not been exhibiting risk even as state and local governments have been suffering sharp decreases in revenue along with increased demands for services. This typical muni fund chart is from Mike 'Mish' Shedlock:




Read the entire article, it is sobering, The problems in non- Federal government borrowing and spending are long- standing. What is surprising is that reaction in the credit markets has been so long in coming.

Ambrose Evans- Pritchard:


Eurozone debt crisis spreads to Belgium on rising political risk

Europe's debt woes have moved closer to the core of monetary union after Standard & Poor's threatened to downgrade Belgium over the failure of Flemings and Walloons to form a government.

The yield spread on Belgian 10-year bonds has ballooned to 102 basis points over German Bunds, raising fears of a funding squeeze next year. S&P said the country needs to refinance debt equal to 11pc of GDP next year, leaving it "exposed to rising real interest rates".

"It's ugly for our reputation," said Jean Deboutte, head of Belgium's debt office. "This is bearable but the premiums are mounting little by little."

The country has been limping along with caretaker ministers since Flemish separatists emerged as the biggest party in June. Talks have broken down over the scale of subsidies to the poorer French-speaking areas, making Belgium a microcosm of EMU's North-South divide.

It is unclear whether the political system can muster the discipline of the early 1990s when Belgium came back from the brink of a debt compound spiral with an impressive fiscal squeeze.

"We believe Belgium's prolonged domestic political uncertainty poses risks," said S&P. "Belgium's current caretaker government may be ill-equipped to respond to shocks to public finances. If Belgium fails to form a government soon, a downgrade could occur, potentially within six months."

Spain also faced fresh debt woes at an auction on Tuesday. The yield on €2bn (£1.7bn) of one-year bills jumped to 3.4pc, up 100 basis points in a month. "It was pretty dire," said David Owen from Jefferies Fixed Income.

Mr Owen said the surge in yields on US Treasuries is causing the cost of capital to jump across the global system, including Spain. "This is raising the bar for everybody," he said.

While Spain can still borrow at a manageable cost, it is storing up rollover risk by issuing debt at short maturities. The IMF said Spain must refinance €220bn this year. Moody's this week raised its estimate of Spanish bank losses to €176bn, up from €108bn a year ago.


Here is the March NYMEX crude contract. Energy prices have vaulted from merely outrageously expensive to unbearably so:





The so- called 'Credit Crisis' is far from over, folks. In fact, a new and far more ominous chapter is unfolding right now.

Risk is migrating away from markets that can be propped up with low- cost credit bailouts toward markets which cannot be bailed out at all. Cost shifting from the wealthy to the non- wealthy has reached point of diminished returns.

 - Many analysts suggest hyper-inflation as the cause of the downturn. This is not likely but hard to measure. Areas that already acknowledge inflation such as China have relatively inaccessible bond markets that cannot accurately reflect inflation risk. In the US, the lack of wage pressure and the high fuel costs make inflation a non- factor. Added funds from monetary authorities are swept into liquidity traps and remain out of circulation. What circulates instead is ongoing moral hazard.

 - Much of the current downturn reflects the lineup of finance beggars waiting their turn at the bailout trough. Falling bond prices are a consequence of endless moral hazard. The bailout of one entity leads to the impossible condition of bailouts for all. Refusing to bail a particular entity results in finance holding entire economies hostage. A point is reached when markets acknowledge the limits of both moral hazard and the possibility of endless bailouts. What is taking place right now are markets reflecting this increase in risk.

 - The energy markets are Key Men that cannot be propped up as the necessary prop is a sharp increase in the amount of fuel made available on these markets. The Establishment has been whistling past this fuel- price/availability graveyard since the current debt crisis emerged in 2007. New, low cost fuel is not forthcoming. Peak oil is real and in the past. The percentage of economic output directed toward the fuel input is increasing with the effect being felt @ the (profit) margins of businesses marketing fuel- dependent goods and services.

High input prices are felt throughout the world's economies as these are forms or extensions of the energy business. All goods are repackaged petroleum to some degree, most services require petroleum in their exercise. Increased fuel costs are charged against margins. The first to feel fuel price effects are workers whose jobs are sacrificed in efforts to maintain profits.

Unemployment effects municipalities downstream as workers morph from taxpayers to consumers of government services. The productive, 'real' economy loses the ability to service debts.

 - The contest is between input and output. High fuel prices allocate funds toward fuel away from fuel's products and fuel- dependent services. This is the margin- shrinking mechanism of peak oil and high nominal fuel prices. High fuel prices puts companies dependent upon cheap fuel out of business. At some point the consequent decline in economic activity destroys demand. Fuel prices then decline.

 - Fuel price allocation has reached finance as funds ordinarily spent on bond market 'products' are now diverted to the products' fuel supply. The connections between debt service and worker output are not tenuous. The only source of debt service funding is output, not bailouts or central bank monetization. Without fuel at a price that allows profits, the ability of those at the bottom of the economic food chain to support speculators evaporates. Plummeting bond prices indicate increasing awareness of this bit of economic common sense on the part of speculators.

As they see rising fuel and commodity prices as a 'sure bet', speculators shift funds away from bonds toward commodity inputs. By doing so they amplify the condition they seek to avoid! Increased input costs reduce the ability of workers to carry rapidly increasing debt service burdens. The bond decline becomes a rout as fuel prices remain at the business- destroying high levels, held there by flows of speculative funds from bonds into fuel futures.

The outcome of this shift is the end of hyper- inflation within finance. Economic output is seen as 'risky'. This risk amplifies credit reallocation in the short term from output to input. A vicious allocation driven- compounding spiral is not out of the question, gaining force until demand destruction and consequent declines in fuel prices remove the allocation 'incentive'.

The economy is in grave danger! Adding central bank funds to finance will make matters worse. Funds will either flow to commodities increasing credit risks and amplifying the spiral or flow back to central bank 'reserves' where they make visible the irrelevance of the central banks when relevance is most needed.

The current run- up in fuel prices appears to represent a reprise of the 2008 Great Oil Spike at much lower dollar levels. Declines in fuel prices will be reflected across the entire risk/finance ambit. Bonds will be revealed as the liquidity traps they have always been, along with other risk assets. If the bond decline continues or increases, margin calls will reveal insolvencies and deleveraging will turn ugly.

Derivative positions held by speculators are also @ risk. Major banks such as JP Morgan- Chase are increasingly vulnerable to margin calls and consequent failure. According to Steve Organ.

As I pointed out to you on many occasions, it is the rapid fall in bond prices that are disturbing the bond derivatives. You see there are over 70 trillion dollars of interest rate swaps owned by the bankers and the majority is owned by JPMorgan. In a nutshell, these guys have bought trillions of long bonds in the future and shorted an equal supply of short term say 30 days notes at zero yield. Thus a rise in future bond yields of say one full percent is causing massive dollar losses for JPMorgan ie. say 40 trillion x 1% interest rate loss = 400 billion dollars enough to wipe them and just about every other banker into oblivion. This is the paper default that I say will happen. The other default of course is a physical default which will produce the same bank run.


'Physical' here means gold and silver positions on metals exchanges that cannot be filled by the banks. What supports all the finance 'Key Men' is a web of claims that exists only when the validity of both the claims and the integrity of the web itself is not called into question.

 - The bond markets are Key Men that cannot be propped. They are simply too large and doing so would amplify any risk that propping can only amplify. The propping efforts to date, including the recent, budget- busting tax 'deal' in Washington are a large reason why bond yields world- wide are skyrocketing.

At the same time, the central banks are limited as to the amount of monetizing they can effect. Monetizing is an 'end around' the markets, which would likely respond by dumping the much larger amounts of existing debt on the central banks at any price. This would precipitate the crisis the central banks are so desperate to avoid!

This Christmas season is going to be 'interesting', folks. What is likely is a change in perceptions, a present that not all will welcome. Hang onto your hats, folks!

Monday, December 13, 2010

Moonday Bits and Pieces:

Jim Chanos is a China bear. He mentions something in this interview to keep in mind: There are many powerful interests on the inflation balance: Bernanke and his printing press, the dollar carry trade, China's current account surplus along with its underwater/grasping Nomenklatura and out of control mercantile trading structures.

According to Jim Chanos, Chinese manufacturing business can be added to this group:





Sez Chanos via Mike Shedlock:

"China is building US-priced condos where the average income is $3500 per person."

Margins on Chinese companies are razor thin. If China hikes rates substantially most companies in China will lose money. Chanos thinks they already are. "Every company we have looked at has accounting issues. The lower you get in the story the more interesting it becomes."

Chanos notes the China economy is largely a real estate bubble on a Pharonic scale.

"China probably will  build 12  to 15 million residential units this year. Put that in perspective, at the top of the market in the States in '06 we built  two and a half million units ..."

Yowzah!

Industrial output and returns constrain the ability of the Establishment to raise rates to combat inflation. China's business cannot afford deflation, This is another vote for more BPOC printing and more under- the- table lending along with an even more pronounced PR campaigning pimping China's inflation fighting.

Meanwhile. looking back over some of the interesting articles about futures trading activity during the Great Oil Price Spike period of 2008. A lot of interesting stuff was going on:

The estimable Yves Smith (Susan Webber) noted distress among grain farmers who could not find storage because the grain storage companies were unable to inexpensively hedge in the futures markets:

Since 1959, grain producers have been able to hedge the price of their wheat, corn and soybean crops on the Chicago Board of Trade through the use of futures contracts, which are agreements to buy or sell a specific amount of a commodity for a fixed price on some future date.

More recently, the exchange has offered another tool: options on those futures contracts, which allow option holders to carry out the futures trade, but do not require that they do so. Trading in options is not as effective a hedge, farmers say, but it does not require them to put up as much cash as is required to trade futures.

These tools have long provided a way to lock in the price of a crop as it is planted, eliminating the risk that prices will drop before it is harvested. With these hedging tools, grain elevators could afford to buy crops from farmers in advance, sometimes a year or more before the harvest.

But that was yesterday. It simply is not working that way today. (2008)

Futures, for example, are less reliable. They work as a hedge only if they fall due at a price that roughly matches prices in the cash market, where the grain is actually sold. Increasingly — for disputed reasons — grain futures are expiring at prices well above the cash-market price.

When that happens, farmers or elevator owners wind up owing more on their futures hedge than the crops are worth in the cash market. Such anomalies create uncertainty about which price accurately reflects supply and demand — a critical issue, since the C.B.O.T. futures price is the benchmark for grain prices around the world.


Two outcomes: one is a transfer of funds from the producer to futures' traders which explains the divergence @ settlement as well as market volatility. The other is that the market pricing ability vanishes as participants make bilateral trades off the exchanges.


I have no doubt that the manipulation of global energy prices which is taking place does so not on exchanges, but in trading within the Brent Complex where the key transactions take place on the telephone 


Here's another futures market tale from Chris Cook by way of the The Oil Drum. Chris ran the International Petroleum Exchange before it morphed into the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE). He knows where the bodies are buried. A lot of information is packed into this article which is worth the read:

The founder entrepreneur behind the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) is Jeffrey Sprecher - the current CEO - who saw early the potential of screen trading for energy. He acquired the US-based Continental Power Exchange in 1997 as awareness of the Internet began to spread, and everyone grabbed for market platform territory, with Enron Online leading the way.

But my understanding is that the Continental Power Exchange would in all likelihood have gone the way of most Internet start ups had Gary Cohn of Goldman Sachs and John Shapiro of Morgan Stanley not had dinner and agreed to set up an exchange. Their two firms put up the initial capital, and their stroke of genius was to offer to the other founder members - BP, Deutsche Bank, Shell, Soc Gen and Total - an inspired deal. In exchange for providing liquidity these traders would receive equity in the exchange, alongside Sprecher's Continental Power Exchange, which was the other founder.

At a stroke ICE was created and had transcended the Liquidity/Neutrality paradox of the Internet: if a platform is neutral, then it's not liquid: and if it's liquid, it's not neutral. By 2001 things were really cooking; other trader/shareholders had joined ICE (having had to buy in); but the key was to actually reach the thousands of participants out there who were the actual “end users” of the market.

An approach to acquire NYMEX was rejected, since NYMEX membership was dominated by independent “locals” who were and are in competition with the investment banks as financial intermediaries. However, in July 2001 ICE acquired for a pittance the International Petroleum Exchange – which was set up and owned by brokers - having made the IPE an offer they couldn't refuse ie “....accept this offer, or we take our business elsewhere”.

Since then, the ICE has extended beyond energy into other markets, but its core business remains energy.

The Brent Complex

The “Brent Complex” is aptly named, being an increasingly baroque collection of contracts relating to North Sea crude oil, originally based upon the Shell “Brent” quality crude oil contract which originated in the 1980s. It now consists of physical and forward BFOE (the Brent, Forties, Oseberg and Ekofisk fields) contracts in North Sea crude oil; and the key ICE Europe BFOE futures contract which is not a deliverable contract and is purely a financial bet based upon the price in the BFOE forward market.

There is also a whole plethora of other “OTC” contracts involving not only BFOE, but also a huge transatlantic “arbitrage” market between the BFOE contract and the US West Texas Intermediate contract originated by NYMEX, but cloned by ICE Europe.

North Sea crude oil production has been in secular decline for many years, and even though the North Sea crude oil benchmark contract was extended from the Brent quality to become BFOE, there are still only about 70 cargoes, each of 600,000 barrels, of North Sea oil which come out of the North Sea each month, worth at current prices about $2.5 billion. It is the price – as reported by Platts – of these cargoes which is the benchmark for global oil prices either directly (about 60%) or indirectly (through BFOE/WTI arbitrage) for most of the rest.

So it will be seen that traders of the scale of the ICE core membership wouldn't really have to put much money at risk by their standards in order to move or support the global market price via the BFOE market. Indeed the evolution of the Brent market has been a response to declining production and the fact that traders could not resist manipulating the market by buying up contracts and “squeezing” those who had sold oil they did not have. The fewer cargoes produced, the easier the underlying market is to manipulate.

Continues Cook:

The key point to understand is that for a deliverable futures contract like NYMEX's WTI, the futures price converges on the physical price, and not the other way around. What matters in terms of manipulation is the exercise of control over physical oil in tank or in transit, in order to be in position for delivery in accordance with exchange rules.

For six years I oversaw the trading and delivery cycle of the IPE's deliverable Gas Oil contract and can categorically say that neither IPE nor the London Clearing House saw any reason to even consider position limits other than in the month of delivery itself. Even were the Clearing members to be negligent or mad, IPE took care to ensure that any of their clients who still had contracts open were in a position to make or take delivery in accordance with the rules. I knew that all of the action in what was occasionally Europe's biggest game of “chicken” was taking place in the physical market between the consenting adults whom I had on my speed dial.

I have no doubt that the manipulation of global energy prices which is taking place does so not on exchanges, but in trading within the Brent Complex where the key transactions take place on the telephone or – in a modern twist – in the instant messaging chat-rooms to which most of the negotiations have migrated.

Some of the resulting contracts are registered and cleared by ICE Europe and elsewhere, but most remain open bilaterally between seller and buyer. So most of the huge volume of transactions which take place in ICE Europe and NYMEX are in fact “hedges” of the risks taken on by financial intermediaries in these opaque off-exchange transactions. The futures markets are the tail, not the dog: the problem is that the tail can be seen, but the dog is invisible.

Does this sound familiar? Keep this in mind when you consider what is happening on the COMEX, in gold and silver markets. Continues Chris:

A combination of market hype, the opacity of the Brent Complex and the relatively small scale of trading of the benchmark BFOE crude oil contract enabled the long run up in prices, and several observers believe that the dramatic spike to $147.00 per barrel was the specific outcome of the collapse of SemGroup which that company's management subsequently blamed mainly on Goldman Sachs.

For those interested in the history there is Cook's TOD article along with FBI Director Louis Freeh's report on Semgroup's activities. Trading entity Semgroup was the target of Goldman- Sachs and its trading entity J. Aron during the spike. Semgroup folded in 2008, just before the peak in June of that year. Did Goldman price- fixing contribute to Semgroup's failure? Did Goldman fix prices so as to topple Semgroup?

Meanwhile: we have another 'Blast From the Past' by way of the estimable Steve Waldman who examines 'renting' a commodity and 'convenience yield'. Back in 2008, every finance analyst was interested in commodities and energy, even Paul Krugman! Sez Waldman:

Suppose someone offered to buy your vacuum cleaner today for $100, and sell it back to you next week for $80, with no risk of wear or breakage. Would you? It would depend how much you value the use of your snorter. If you refuse, we might infer that a week's access to the pleasures of vacuuming is worth 20 bucks to you. We call that value of temporary use a "convenience yield". It's as if having the vacuum cleaner around pays you $20, even if no cash changes hands. Maybe we observe negative forward yields on oil because the smell of oil in the morning is priceless to guys in cowboy hats. (Or not... see below for a more plausible account of oil's "convenience yield".)


Get the idea? Waldman is confusing so let me clarify: if YOU buy/sell back MY vacuum cleaner I get the $20! If you don't, I don't. What Waldman calls convenience yield I call 'rent'. Yes, you can rent my vacuum cleaner for a month for twenty bucks.

Nobody is going to pay me $20 to hang onto my own vacuum although someone might pay me $20 to allow them the right to access my vacuum during any given month's period.

Get it? Convenience yield is the option value ... of vacuum cleaners!

Basically, CY is the call option price of any given month's crude futures contract. It's a call option as the bias is on the 'buy' side, that is, a discounting of future prices rather than a premium. The CY is 'factored in' alongside the markets' contango or backwardation.

What Waldman poses is a preference for the 'now' that amounts to persistent discount of future crude relative to crude in hand. In other words, 'convenience yield' is not just rent or access but also a form of cash preference as expressed as an options price. You want your good now and will pay -- in the form of discounted futures prices -- for the privilege of getting your good now. What is the yield on such an ambiguous good?

From Jan 1986 through May 2008, oil futures have reflected a convenience yield of 8% per year on average. (This is in rough agreement with the overall mean of 0.021% per day calculated here by Milonas and Henker, see Table 3.)

Suppose that the current convenience yield is about 8% and three month interest rates are about 2%. (Today, they are about 0.5%: steve from virginia.) Then a one-year futures contract should be about 6% cheaper than spot, and a four-month-out contract should be about 1.4% cheaper than a one-month-out contract (reflecting 3 months of storage). At the end of May, the 4-month-out contract was in "backwardation", but was only 0.5% cheaper than the 1-month, still too expensive given the convenience yield. Oil dudes could have earned (on an annualized basis) about 3.6% more than the risk free rate (about 5.6% overall) buying high and selling low, but enjoying the privilege of storage. Now that oil is in gentle contango (as of June 17, the 4 month contract costs about 1% more than the 1 month), buying forward and storing looks like a really fantastic deal.

What is this "convenience yield"? Is it real? It seems like it must be, the economics of an 8% return aren't subtle in the data. But when I first encountered this idea, it baffled me. So instead of talking oil, let's talk hotels.

Suppose you have a hotel, it's morning, and you've got a room that isn't yet booked for tonight. Empty rooms end up costing you about $10 a night, considering your rent, maintenance, utilities, etc. But, you estimate there's about a 50% chance that a weary last-minute traveler will come by and pay your walk-in rate of $150 for the room. So, the risk-neutral expected value of your empty room is $65 [(150 ÷ 2) - 10]. You're risk-averse, not risk neutral, though. You'd accept a certain $60 rather than a 50-50 chance of losing $10 or earning $140. That $60 is the "convenience yield" on your empty room, it's what having a room empty, in case opportunity strikes, is worth to you.


Okay, questions? Yes, Waldman has a 'thing' about cowboy hats. Yes, read the entire article, Waldman always has something interesting to say and is witty, as well!

Why 'rent' oil? The obvious answer is to sell short. However, selling a futures contract IS selling short. This would not represent an 8% bias as there are an equal number of longs! Does oil 'rent' or option value represent an excess of short- selling 'demand'? Hmmm ... Chris Cook, again:

It appears to me that what has been occurring in the oil market may have been that – through the intermediation of the likes of J Aron in the Brent complex – long term funds have been lending money to producers – effectively interest-free - and in return the producers have been lending oil to the funds. This works well for as long as funds flow into the market, or do not withdraw in quantity, but once funds withdraw money from the market, there is a sudden collapse in price.

A combination of market hype, the opacity of the Brent Complex and the relatively small scale of trading of the benchmark BFOE crude oil contract enabled the long run up in prices, and several observers believe that the dramatic spike to $147.00 per barrel was the specific outcome of the collapse of SemGroup which that company's management subsequently blamed mainly on Goldman Sachs.


What Chris means is the producers have been renting their vacuum cleaners to the funds to allow the funds to create synthetic or 'phantom' positions that allow control of the underlying price. We see the same activity taking place in precious metals as well as in the long Treasury bond that we discussed last week.

What the 8% convenience yield partially represents is a 'volatility premium' that intermediaries pay to keep control of volatility. Since futures cannot determine final price, what traders on that market CAN control is volatility prior to the final price being set. Volatility is useful!

:)

High volatility is harsh and profitable to grain traders who can use it to bankrupt grain elevators and farmers and push trades off the exchanges. Low and comforting to oil producers who love the high prices but don't want to rock the boat for political reasons - or generate a devastating spike.

As if the super- high prices aren't devastating enough ...

NEXT: the story that gold is telling.

Thursday, December 9, 2010

Another Day Filled With Nothing ... But Bits and Pieces

What are the choices facing people around the world as the oil/economic cinch tightens around them? With rising unemployment and government cutbacks in 'austerity states' what do people give up?

Here's an answer from Ireland on the road to ruin:

'The two Brians haven't a heart between them'

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Claire O'Brien Irish Independent

Thursday December 09 2010

"I WOULD cry, but I can't," says Ann Hughes, but her voice breaks as she tries to come to terms with the Budget cuts that will take food from her table.

A full-time care(give)r to her 31-year-old autistic daughter Debbie, Ann is already relying on her only working son to help when her care giver's payment doesn't last the week.

She doesn't want to cry, but the tears flow.

"The bills have to be paid," she says. There's the rent, electricity, heating and the credit union loan she has that bought the little car she needs to get Debbie around Tullamore, Co Offaly, where they live.

Right. The choice is to heat the house or drive. Believe me, most Americans, Europeans, Chinese (with carz) or others (with carz) around the world are making the same choice. Starve the poor baby girl and keep paying for the car. Blame Cowen and Lenihan.

What comes is inevitable: "You keep the food, I'll take the car!"

Notice, I left the car ads that emblazon the Independent web page. The hectoring to get into (unserviceable) debt in order to make the necessities/car choice is unending. Internet is fast becoming the same, worthless advertising medium television has been for decades. It's smartest minds and largest companies exerting every effort to convince you how much you suck if you don't buy goods ... such as carz.

Mr. Advertising Man Internet is a 'basic, human right', correct? Google and Toyota and our other self- created golems have won, along side the worthless and corrupt apparatus of governments world wide which exist to support them!

This article demonstrates why whining about 'heartlessness' is self- immolating. The gas- guzzling car is always sacrosanct. There is no real choice as our 'hip and trendy' culture orbits around car 'ownership'. You 'own' the car, the bank owns you. You get to make the heart- rending choice whether you drive or eat.

While this is taking place, the consumption of irreplaceable capital bankrupts the car- centric culture from the bottom up. Ann Hughes's car is literally taking food off her own table. We humans are competing against our own cars for resources! How stupid is that?

The ice caps melt and the great cities of the world slip into the ocean we can blame whom?

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Sad part is that few take the time to make the connection between convenience and 'appearances' on one hand, and onrushing system breakdown on the other.

Meanwhile, the estimable Chris Martenson has the usual sales- pitch for inflation (and gold buying) over @ Zero Hedge:


Don't Be Fooled: Inflation Has The Upper Hand


Here at Martenson Central, we are endlessly keeping a close eye out for the emergence of deflation, defined here as the purchasing power of the dollar going up.

Technically, inflation and deflation are terms that indicate a particular combination of money surplus or deficit (respectively), demand for money (of which velocity is but one measure), and demand for various goods and services (which themselves may be in abundance or short supply).

The reason that the inflation vs. deflation debate has been so noisy, yet simultaneously so murky, is that all of these intersecting variables impact the final equation. It is like the difference between trying to balance a single broomstick on your outstretched hand vs. trying to balance a broomstick with three well-greased hinges at points along its length. The former is tricky enough to balance; the latter would be impossible for nearly everyone.

Chris inserts the usual straw man arguments:

Some try to reduce the inflation/deflation debate to a single broomstick (“…all we need to do is look at declining credit and see that we are in deflation!”), but in my opinion, that is far too simplistic a view. We still need to consider base money creation, velocity, and the relative level of faith in current and future monetary policy among the majority of market participants.

The argument for deflation says that because of declining credit, people will hold onto whatever money they have for dear life, unsure if more money will be forthcoming. In this case, the velocity of money will slow and collapse.

Next ...

Conclusion:

While the theories about the role of money and credit as the drivers of the ‘-flations’ are very important to understand, what we really care about at the end of the day is the final impact on our purchasing power. By nearly every measure, except in limited cases sprinkled throughout (with housing being the most visible and important), we find that prices have been rising smartly. Or we could say that the dollar and other fiat currencies have been sinking, which is a more accurate way to think about the dynamic.


Hmmm ... prices are going up therefor we have inflation. Right.

Please read the whole article and the linked additions. Chris is brilliant; if you haven't take his Crash Course.


The oil value of dollars is set by the economy, not by the markets or by central banks


Meanwhile, I completely disagree with his conclusions about inflation. With diminishing oil supplies -- as indicated by dollar markets rather than fudge-able 'production' and 'reserve' figures -- inflation is impossible. At some point the oil price rises to a level where economic activity slows sufficiently to kill demand for oil. When this happens the oil price drops. The high price level is the 'upper bound' of dollar or other currency devaluation relative to oil. It is therefor oil which sets the value of dollars, euros, yen, yuan and other currencies at the all- important margin. Since the dollar is the world's reserve currency, its value is the fulcrum over which other currency values are leveraged.

Since the dollar value upper bound is fixed by economic forces that matter, activities by fun- loving central bankers are compleately irrelevant! The Federal Reserve seeks to become so by forcing the dollar lower on foreign exchange markets. It does this by activating its network of primary dealers, by manipulating gold and silver prices, by stage- managing currency interventions, by purchasing bonds in the open market then selling these same bonds under the table in the derivatives markets and by other well-known central bank tactics. These tactics backfire when they trigger speculative bubbles in crude oil which force the price to the level where economic activity slows down. The oil value of dollars is set by the economy, not by the market or by central banks.

The takeaway is that the Fed and other central banks can effect monetary policy and pretend to set currency values only when it doesn't matter. Central banks attempting to matter can only effect values adversely, when they stupidly force oil prices to the upper bound! Doing so reinforces central banks' impotence and self- destructiveness.

Four- dollar gas and Planet Bernanke gets burned in effigy in front of the Federal Reserve building! Four dollar gas blows up the finance activities of the waste- based economy @ the same time.

When economic activity slows, market entities that rely on currency flows are starved for short- term roll- over funds.

The fast- becoming- unproductive world's economies are reduced to ponzi schemes of buying and selling money in order to obtain oil, so that the Ann Hugheses of the world can burn it up for absolutely nothing. Upsetting the cash flows through these ponzis is fatal. On the one hand the blameful Hugheses inexorably bankrupt all around by way of resource depletion, on the other is the periodic mad scramble by collapsing ponzis desperately seeking liquidity.

If it wasn't so tragic it would be hilarious.

Question: if there be inflation, where is the liquidity? The current answer is endless cycles of re- lending; solving credit problems with additional credit. What looks like inflation is borrowing from the left pocket of the sweater to 'loan' to the right pocket at interest. This nonsense is taking place so that unraveling the same sweater from the bottom can be continued! Right now, the pockets are about to disappear.

If the world had those four or five more Saudi Arabias we would have inflation. We don't so we won't.

The price rises are caused by two forces: one is allocation by price where entrenched credit mechanisms allow this form of allocation to take place. Higher education and medical costs are two such areas. Education has its own credit system of 'student loans' that has specific legal supports that do not exist in other sectors. One can default on consumer credit or house loans without personal penalty while student loans are ... persistent and difficult to discharge. Consequently, the education lending regime has not fallen bankrupt, yet.

The same is true with the medical 'industry' which also has its embedded credit system of 'insurances' along with the willingness of those in extremis to tap any and all unused forms of credit or savings in order to save their own or loved- ones' lives. It is only when the savings are stripped, the education non- productive or the participants unwilling to participate in these particular ponzi schemes further, will the costs of these sectors fall alongside real estate,

The other force which pushes prices higher is changes in marginal returns: as business declines firms attempt to maintain margins by raising unit prices for their diminished customer bases. Obviously, this is a rear- guard tactic as there is an upper bound to the amount of increase that any given group of customers can afford. As with crude oil, rising prices reach a level where customer purchasing activity slows and demand is destroyed. In this way companies price themselves into bankruptcy.

People can endure very high prices for food and other necessities. Allocation will take place by price with food and energy taking ever- larger shares of business and personal expenses. Keep in mind that most goods and services are petroleum in varying forms. Some are more necessary than others. Most modern food is a form of petroleum.

Nominal prices rise and fall responding to market forces. The prices tracked by indexes are misleading. What matters is the cost of energy as well as food (energy) relative in proportion to other costs. The percentage of economic activity allocated to energy production and use increases at the expense of other activities. Unfortunately for all of us, these other activities are what make up our 'moderne' economy. Since this economy exists to enable the Ann Hugheses of the world to waste energy, it is eating itself for dinner.

Or, unraveling its own sweater.

Keep in mind also:

Ordinary price inflation is the outcome of business expansion. I define inflation as the worth relationship between economic activity and the money that is used to transact it. As activity increases in value, the worth of money declines as it should. The functioning world must have valuable business and worthless money. That is, money with intrinsic negative value. This intrinsic negative value represents the rate of ordinary inflation.

It is the business activity that must have value, not the money, which is just a tool of business. Business expands, credit to enable it expands, money supply expands along with velocity; the unit value of money declines.

Bernanke may not understand the foregoing principle but his attempt to create business activity value by increasing inflation and some form of the money supply acknowledges it. Unfortunately for Bernanke, business creates ordinary inflation, not the other way around.

As business expands, the firms so engaged lend into existence what funds are needed. By doing so debt expands. After lengthy periods of credit expansion and large debts, these become unservicable by business cash flow, diminishing business value. Debt must either be repaid or written off and forgiven. This expansion and contraction of accumulated debt is the business cycle.

Non- business establishments adding money (or credit) to the economy to increase the money supply in circulation is hyper-inflation. Whether funds enter circulation or not depends upon business activity. When there is no activity the added funds become reserves. These reserves represent an increase in money value relative to business worth. Adding too much reserves causes problems for those who must manage them. These problems in turn create an upper bound on the amounts of reserves that can be accumulated. If for no other reason, excess reserves cannot be turned into money- stores of value other than the notational currency. This is what is taking place in the gold and silver markets. You can be sure that gold and silver bankers are complaining to the central banks about excess base money creation!

Deflation takes place when the intrinsic value of money increases while the worth of business declines. Notice how currencies become harder to find when business contracts. Unlike money, business activity cannot be hoarded. When money is hoarded as by means of 'excess reserves' deflation is taking place.

There are no such thing as 'excess reserves' during economic or business expansions. Reserves become phantom as there is too much demand for credit.

Make an note of the terms, as what many call 'inflation' is to me 'hyper-inflation'.

The difference between deflation which is the natural part of the business cycle and depression is that the latter is a form of social conflict waged between the rentiers and their putative 'customers'. In general, without interference by governments, depressions end with the destruction of the rentiers.

For those rentiers out there reading this, watch out!

Wednesday, December 8, 2010

Bees and Pees ...

One of the analysts I have started following is Harvey Organ, who follows gold and silver on the COMEX along with other kinds of trading action in related markets (no wheat or lumber, sorry). I started watching the gold/silver delivery issues but today's action on in the Treasury markets is worth looking at.

Sez Harvey:

I would like to point out that during Sept and the first week of October, the 30 yr bond reached a price of 134.00 as the Fed announced that they were going to purchase the long bond hoping to help the housing industry. It seems that this has no failed.

The street does not want to talk about the other important feature of a fall in long bond prices and this is the huge derivative losses that are burning inside AIG and JPMorgan tonight. I am going to be very simplistic on this. If you feel up to it, I urge you to see Kirby's paper " The Elephant in the Room" for a complete and thorough analysis of interest rate swaps and what it means.

Here goes;

JPMorgan is by far the largest derivative player in the world and they are the largest player in interest rate derivatives. Most of these are in the field of interest rate swaps .In simple terms, our hero JPMorgan, on orders from the Fed buys a trillions of dollars of long bonds in the future and at the same time sells or shorts trillions of dollars of short term money of say 30 days or 90 days also in the future. The long bond was purchased at say a yield of3.4% to 4% and the short term money was shorted at a yield of .05% per annum or roughly par.

The huge purchases of these swaps (buy long term bonds in the future and short 90 day treasuries in the future) lowers the price of real treasury bonds as this stimulates the purchase of these bonds at the present time. This is why the bond vigilantes were nowhere to be seen in the states. It will also explain why our camp knew it was impossible for interest rates to rise as this would blow up JPMorgan.

Now we see that the long bond yield is rising which is putting much pressure as losses mount on JPMorgan. They gain nothing from the short end as they shorted at 100 cents on the dollar and that is today's price.

The real risk to JPMorgan is the speed of which long bond yields rise as they cannot get out of their contracts. This will probably be the spark that ignites inside a coal mine. A yield of say 5% would create a 1.6% loss of over 640 billion dollars (they state, I believe, a notional 90 trillion interest rate swaps so 45 trillion on the long end and 45 trillion on the short end). That would blow up JPMorgan and create havoc and collateral damage equal to a neutron bomb in the financial area of Wall Street.

I hope this explains in simple terms how significant this is and I will now report on this as the bond yields have been rising exponentially these past few days.

For those of you who are mathematically inclined, I urge you to read Kirby's paper and you will come to same conclusion as we have on the huge "elephant in the room" ie.

JPMorgan's huge interest rate swaps. So JPMorgan not only has a silver problem but an interest rate problem!!



The 'Kirby paper' referred to is Rob Kirby's analysis of interest rate swaps found on the estimable Jim Puplava's Financial Sense website.

While these swaps are created and traded in the dark underbelly of the shadow banking system they serve the purpose of keeping a floor under long treasury prices ... so far.

Uh oh ... so far? The swaps become dangerous when the market ignores the message the swaps are preaching and moves so quickly and the swap positions cannot be unwound! As usual, the problem is leverage: JPM is massively leveraged in the synthetic market. The faster and farther the underlying Treasury market moves the farther underwater JPM becomes. In a way, Morgan's approach is similar to the Long Term Capital Management's failed arbitrage strategy of the late 1990's.

Here's the 30 year Treasury futures chart from estimable TFC charts:




Ouch! Here's a look @ the rout in the 10 year. This tranche has been actively bought by the Fed as part of the fast becoming controversial Quantitative Easing 'policy':


Kirby notes that the five Too Big To Fail banks make the bulk of the interest rate swaps. Question is, when JPM or Citi blow up and lose another trillion will the taxpayer be called upon to bail them out AGAIN?

There is a real problem in the bond markets developing right under everyone's noses. Add $90 oil and finance runs out of maneuvering room. Why the bond pressure?

  • Too much debt is being dumped onto the markets. There is insufficient organic demand for this much debt. Productive enterprises have been replace by (debt) ponzi schemes. The debt market is saturated.
  • Too much uncertainty about even the strongest economies. German has been having difficulties selling its bonds (!). Now, America?
  • The risk is not inflation but the ability of markets to absorb the flood of new bonds.
  • US states are in the cross hairs. Anyone who thinks Illinois or California are 'credit- worthy' is smoking crack.
  • Obama is breaking his arm patting his back over his capitulation to the Republicans in the Senate ... while the bond market is voting with its feet. Neither Obama nor Bernanke's performance last Sunday instill confidence in American leadership.
  • Meanwhile the Eurozone leadership is exposed as callow and self- defeating. The world's major countries' statesmen are failing. 

What would trigger the avalanche is the failure of a large institution that cannot or will not be bailed out. What is happening now is similar to what took place over the Summer of 2008: rising oil prices and derivatives pressures on systemically important institutions. Then: Fannie, Freddie, AIG and Lehman. Now: Citi, California, Spain and J.P. Morgan- Chase. Like 2008, the high oil price risk was spilling over into every vulnerable market, stress- testing every susceptible market participant.

The difference in 2008 was that the Fed and Treasury both had plenty of 'ammunition' and goodwill to put to use.

Now?

???

Tuesday, December 7, 2010

Bytes and Pyces ...

Oil prices are above $90 per barrel. OUCH!

Brace yourself for the inevitable crash. If the bull gets legs and it turns into a real bubble the deflationary impact will be shattering.

The higher the price the greater the downturn. The crash could happen tomorrow or next year. The new high could be the 2008 annual average price of $97 or the 2008 high of $147 could be retested. At some level economic activity cannot support the price and the cascade begins.

Look @ all these supported and inflated asset markets as currency traps. It looks as if the oil trap is getting ready to close. When it does the rest of the currency/liquidity traps world- wide will follow. Liquidity will vanish and margin calls begin. It seems the oil price spike/crash will be the trigger of the next, long- anticipated deleveraging event.

It will be hard to see how the Fed will be able to contain either the revealed risk(s) or the resulting panic.

Here is where the waste- based economy and what is wasted come together. Folks blame Bernanke for this but the Fed doesn't buy crude -- it would have to resell it -- but everyone else does. It is the prospect of recovery which is sending crude higher, recovery in the US, in the Eurozone and continuing in Asia (with the exception of Japan). You are watching the oil price governor on 'growth' in action.

The total number of people around the world who actually make a financial gain out of their final use of petroleum products is likely the same number who own gold. That is the readership of Zero Hedge.

The rest who 'use' petrol simply waste it. 60 years, a trillion barrels, all gone and nothing to show for it but crushing debts and a bunch of crumbling 'infrastructures' built to waste fuel.

Peak oil is real, folks. You are getting a chance to live your oil constrained future.

Oil bulls are in denial, they believe -- as in religion -- that high oil prices have little economic effect other than an increase in their personal profits and 'more production'. As modern experience has demonstrated repeatedly, oil price spikes have been followed by price crashes. The last bull market that ended in 2008 failed to bring new production onto the markets. What happens instead is that high prices destroy oil demand. The mechanism is high prices bankrupting businesses that enable crude waste.

It isn't pump price: the customer can afford $4 gas but cannot afford the new house or new car or new jet ski or a vacation. Companies fail ... and they have been. The customer loses his or her job.

Keep in mind that pretty much ALL business in developed countries are versions of the oil business, they ALL use crude, that oil is embedded in all goods and services. As countries develop and use more fuel their economies orbit around fuel as well.

The CFTC has not made rules ending position limits for non- hedgers (banks). Open interest in forward months is increasing. Both of these are ominous. Specs piling on an oil bull will pretty much destroy the US economy.

There are many risks in the US and overseas building against the economy: political, F/X and current account imbalances, unserviceable debt, deflating asset bubbles, inflation in energy producing states -- including China which exports coal in the form of consumer goods -- and deteriorating environment. The risk that is front and center is the new oil bubble. Unlike the PM bubbles, oil is used wasted by every person in the world every day. The food you eat is really petroleum, shipped by petroleum, held in stores and shops built with petroleum, taken to your home by petroleum. There is no escape from the risk.

Oil price rise allocates funds from other presumably remunerative uses. The high prices starve other activities. This is why high prices are self- limiting and deflationary. Funds directed toward fuel are directed away from wages, housing, manufacturing, benefits and other economic interests.

It's going to be ugly, folks.

Meanwhile, the gold and silver markets are ... 'interesting'. Gold and silver on the forward markets are in long- term backwardation which is unprecedented. As a commenter here suggested, the futures markets are so unbalanced currently they are becoming useless for price discovery and as a venue for physical exchange. As is usual with gold and other precious metals, the owners are hoarding and supply has vanished leaving would- be longs and canny speculators nowhere to turn but to paper derivatives.

The amount of physical gold in the markets (bullion/coins/jewelry) is small and diminishing. Gold is hard to find @ coin dealers, on Ebay, in the bullion markets and elsewhere. Superimposed on this small physical trading market is an immense and growing 'paper gold' market of futures contracts, options on futures, gold mining stocks, EFT's, warrants, forwards, leases, etc. While it is hard to say how large the paper gold market is relative to physical it is massive.

Many of these paper derivatives are outright frauds. The rest are not as blatant, merely Ponzi schemes.

Trust me when I say there is a lot more paper than physical, this is collateralized by physical held in institutions. All that paper represents putatively valid claims against the physical. As you are certainly aware, the institutions are better positioned to perfect their claims against that physical and to do so at the expense of individuals.

That is why I tell peeps over and over to hold your own physical gold, no paper gold.

The markets are totally lopsided with (unlimited) demand against shrinking supply. Sellers have been bought out of physical markets to the degree that it is more profitable for them to hold or lease rather than to sell. When this happens it is generally the market/exchanges themselves become the counterparties to increasing paper long positions. The exchanges have massive and growing short positions as a consequence; these are settled with more paper with the settlements being pyramided increasing the short leverage exponentially.

Gold is self- marketed as an asset that never loses value like real estate was in the early oughts. Once the marginal gold buyer has entered the market OR some outside force demands margin, the market imbalance swings 180 degrees. The massive short holder now becomes the only buyer for paper gold.

Chances are, the time to sell is when you HAVE to sell or be sold out.

Guess what? That ex- short position- now only gold/silver buyer on planet Earth is Goldman- Sachs or JP Morgan- Chase! Sorry about your gold trade, dude!

BTW, Max Keiser's silver short squeeze against JPM is futile; the bank can borrow unlimited amounts of 'paper silver' from the Fed. It's the paper positions that hold the gold/silver markets hostage even as they are levers used to pump the prices. This is what people don't seem to recognize. Paper gold derivatives are driving PM prices the same way mortgage- backed securities drove real estate prices five years ago.

It's the same people, doing the same thing!

Paper gold instability is why the PM market declined in 2008 as the exchange's banks raped their paper gold customers who had to dump physical to make margin. They had to sell on a market to buyers who had lost billions in other Wall Street Ponzis or they had to surrender margin back to the exchange's banks.

Gold and silver are the Ponzi schemes of the moment. Yes, you can make money if you are nimble. People DID get 20% returns from Bernie Madoff. But ... your physical gold position is held hostage by bank- and insurance company paper gold positions and by lopsided markets.

As for monetary gold: you are living the reason why gold will never be money! If the dollar was gold there would be none in circulation. Gold has always been hoarded as it is right now. That is why 'paper gold' exists in the first place! Think about it! Gold is to money as paper- or fiat gold is to fiat money.

When the oil price spike crashes the physical economy it will crash the 'gold money (paper gold) market at the same time. For those who are insightful it will be a demonstration of gold currency and gold- backed 'paper gold money' in action.

Finally, the US dollar is a defacto hard currency backed informally by crude oil. The upper bound or the price level in dollars where the economy stalls/crashes fixes the dollar/crude relationship. That is, the point where the dollar cannot lose any more value as measured by crude oil.

This 'money' value cannot be determined by gold or silver because the only markets for these elements are fiat derivatives: paper gold or paper silver which are no less fiat than paper dollars. Oil is in common use by all while gold is held only by a few and of that few most gold is held by institutions such as the Treasury, central banks and a few large commercial and bullion banks.

Those are your adversaries/counterparties to your gold dreams and visions. Be careful!